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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to assess cyber security awareness and measures in the Norwegian 
maritime sector. To be able to evaluate the conditions regarding cyber security in the Norwegian 
maritime sector, a self-evaluation questionnaire was sent out to shipping companies and ship`s 
equipment suppliers with connections to Norway. The respondents were asked to rate their 
attitude towards a range of different statements regarding cyber security. Cyber attacks were 
reported in the survey targeting both physical and information assets from external and internal 
sources. An exploratory factor analysis revealed three factors, of which one of them showed 
significant differences on cyber security awareness between shipping companies and equipment 
suppliers. A repeated measures general linear model analysis revealed differences between 
shipping companies and equipment suppliers on their measures taken towards external threats 
directed at physical assets, and that informational assets receive a higher focus than physical 
assets. 
Some theory is provided to give the reader a basic knowledge about cyber security, the 
maritime sector, and its stakeholders.  
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Introduction 
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) did in November 
2011 issue a report on cyber security in the EU maritime sector. The report with the title 
“Analysis of cyber security aspects in the maritime sector” highlighted that the maritime sector is 
lacking awareness on cyber security, and at the same time the maritime sector is getting more 
dependent on ICT to optimize operations. The report explains that maritime transportation for 
cargo and passengers is of crucial importance to the EU, and that the maritime sector is 
considered a part of the European critical infrastructure (ENISA, 2011). 
The ENISA report illustrates the criticality of the maritime sector by referring to that of 
the goods traffic in Europe 2010, 52% was carried by water, an increase of about 7% over a 
period of 10 years. The report also states that more than 43% of internal trade within EU, and 
around 90% of external trade to and from EU is carried by water. Several major seaports are 
located at EU shores, and together they handle a large percentage of the container traffic to and 
from Europe. 3-5% of EU`s GDP is generated by industries and services related to the maritime 
sector (ENISA, 2011). 
Norway has traditionally been, and is still considered a large shipping nation. The 
Norwegian fleet is one of the largest and most advanced in the world, and together with a global 
leading maritime industry, Norway has established a complete and world leading maritime 
cluster (Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, 2013). Of the 500 million tonnes of goods 
transported to, from, and within Norway in 2013, 83% were carried by sea. Of the inland 
transportation with a share of 300 million tonnes, 53% were transported by water. The 
Norwegian external trade is dominated by sea transport. It is also suggested by the Norwegian 
agencies that seaborne transport and related new technology should be prioritized in the future to 
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ensure efficient and eco friendly transportation of goods (Transportetatene, Avinor, 
Jernbaneverket, Kystverket, & Statens vegvesen, 2015).   
The Norwegian maritime industry employs about 100 000 people and creates value of 
about 150-160 billion NOK per annum. Of this, half of the value creation results from shipping 
activities alone (Jakobsen, Mellbye, & Holmen, 2014; Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, 
2013). The GDP generated by the Norwegian maritime industry accounts for almost 6% of 
Norway’s total gross domestic product, and the Norwegian controlled merchant fleet constitutes 
about 5% of the world`s fleet total (Smart Comp, 2013).  
The maritime sector`s importance to Norway. A look at the figures presented in the 
previous section indicates similarities between the criticality of the maritime sector to EU to the 
conditions of the Norwegian sector. As the Norwegian maritime sector constitutes a higher 
percentage of total GDP, and a similar percentage of goods transport carried by maritime 
transportation compared with EU figures, this dependency and hence the importance of the 
maritime sector can be argued to be at least as important to Norway as it is to EU. The maritime 
sector could therefore be considered critical to Norway’s economy, as well as the supply of 
goods performed by maritime transportation is critical to the Norwegian society. Based on the 
Norwegian Ministries (2012a) definition of critical infrastructure that includes supply of goods, 
the maritime transportation could also be regarded as a critical infrastructure.  
The importance of cyber security to the maritime sector. The information exchange in 
the maritime sector is frequent and often contains valuable and detailed information sent over the 
Internet. Ships are equipped with control systems and navigational systems that have known 
vulnerabilities to cyber attacks (CyberKeel, 2014). Norwegian ship`s equipment suppliers 
delivers automated equipment to Norwegian ships (Mellbye & Jakobsen, 2014). An attack on the 
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maritime sector could potentially threaten the Norwegian economy, and hinder maritime 
transportation of goods and passengers as it could in EU (ENISA, 2011). Cyber security to 
protect information and physical assets is therefore important to the maritime sector.  
Aim and research questions 
This thesis sets out to assess the awareness of cyber security and measures in the 
Norwegian maritime sector. Since the maritime sector in Norway is spanning a wide area with 
many diverse actors, some limitations in the choice of the population of interest had to be taken. 
The ship`s equipment suppliers and shipping companies have therefore been given a special 
focus in this thesis.  
Since knowledge about cyber security can help raise awareness about cyber security, 
there is a hope that this thesis can enlighten the reader and in that way create an interest and 
awareness of the topic. A desired goal is that the thesis could be beneficial for stakeholders in the 
maritime sector and to learning institutions. 
Overall aim. The overall aim of this thesis is to assess cyber security awareness and 
measures in the maritime sector in Norway with a special focus on ship owners and equipment 
suppliers.  
Research questions. The research questions for this thesis are: 
• Have they been subjected to cyber attacks?  
• Are the Norwegian maritime equipment suppliers and ship owners aware of cyber 
security related issues?  
• Do they take precautions in order to deal with cyber threats?  
• Are there any differences in how they relate to physical and information aspects 
of cyber security?   
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• Are there any differences between the cyber security measures between ship 
owners and equipment suppliers? 
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Theory 
This part of the thesis sets out to provide the reader with knowledge about cyber security, 
the Norwegian maritime sector, cyber security concern, organizational and technical features, 
and influencing factors. The reason behind the provided theory is to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the different concepts in this thesis, which could be helpful in order to better 
understand the thesis research questions, discussion, and conclusion. 
Definitions 
Maritime sector. The terms maritime sector and maritime industry/industries are used 
ambiguously in literature and in this thesis. The definitions of the maritime industry, industries, 
and maritime sector are quite similar, although maritime industries seem to be the more preferred 
term used in economic and statistical literature. The maritime sector/industry can be divided into 
4 main sectors or groups: Shipping companies including shortsea, deepsea, offshore, and drilling 
and production (rigs); Ship`s equipment including mechanical, electrical and electronic, design, 
trade, and other operating equipment; Yards including new builds, maintenance, repairs, and 
modifications; Maritime services including financial and juridical, technological (engineering, 
design, classification etc.), ports and logistics, and trade (wholesale, brokers etc.) (Mellbye & 
Jakobsen, 2014; Rederi-skatteutvalget, 2006; Reve & Sasson, 2012). 
Use of the word “cyber security”. The spelling of the topic varies within news sources, 
books, and in scientific papers, where the words cybersecurity, cyber security, and cyber-security 
are used interchangeably. Search results in databases containing scientific publications, and from 
popular Internet search engines produce different results with similar content when using the 
different spellings. This is pointed out by Brumfield (2013), and the author of this thesis verifies 
these results. Despite that cybersecurity, cyber security, and cyber-security differ grammatically 
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and provides different search results, they are the same word with different spellings, and are 
probably written differently based on geographical location, and other influences on the writer 
(Brumfield, 2013). For this paper, the phrase cyber security will be used consistently unless 
direct citations require the word spelled differently. The reason for the chosen way of spelling is 
the report made by ENISA (2011), and Norwegian Ministries (2012a), which use the phrase 
cyber security in their writings about the topic. Others, such as the ISO/IEC has grasped the word 
cybersecurity (ISO/IEC, 2012).    
Safety vs. security. It can be useful to have in mind some general differences between 
safety and security when dealing with the concept of cyber security. The terms safety and 
security can be confusing at times, especially in a country as Norway, where the polysemous 
word “Sikkerhet” is referring to both safety and security and thus has to be interpreted from 
context (Albrechtsen, 2003). The following definitions of safety and security are taken from the 
Oxford online dictionaries.  
• Safety is defined as a mass noun as “The condition of being protected from or 
unlikely to cause danger, risk, or injury” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.-d) , and as 
modifier “Denoting something designed to prevent injury or damage” (Oxford 
Dictionaries, n.d.-d).  
• Security as a mass noun is defined as “The state of being free from danger or 
threat” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.-f), and as modifier “The safety of a state or 
organization against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage”, 
“Procedures followed or measures taken to ensure the security of a state or 
organization”, and “The state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear or 
anxiety” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.-f).  
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From the Oxford definitions, it can be hard to spot significant differences, I will therefore 
try to sort them out. Safety and security, although different, have similarities and they can be 
complimentary. It is implied that a safety breach can result in difficulties remaining a desirable 
level of security, while a breach in security can result in failure to ensure safety (Bartnes, 
Nordland, Rostad, & Tondel, 2006). The focus of security lies primarily on intentional, malicious 
acts or events with relations to threats and incidents, while safety concerns mostly those which 
are unintended with origin from hazards and failures (Bartnes et al., 2006). A threat can be seen 
as a “potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a system, individual 
or organization” (ISO/IEC, 2012, p. 7). Even though safety is mostly connected to unintentional 
events, a violation could pose a threat to both security and safety. Violations are considered 
intended, they are however not malicious or carried out to harm or destroy, but rather to reduce 
efforts, time spent, evaluating own solutions as better than existing procedures etc. (Reason, 
1995).  
The concept of security concerns threats that originate from a human source. Security 
threats can further be divided into those originating outside of, and those that originate inside an 
organization. Threats related to security are most often motivated by the will of an individual or a 
group, with a goal to profit or inflict harm (e.g. the acts are intended or willed). However, a 
security threat can also arise from human actions that has unintentionally has led to a 
vulnerability for an organization (Albrechtsen, 2003). 
 Albrechtsen (2003) also argues that intended malicious acts (e.g. threats) are more 
unpredictable than unintended errors (e.g. hazards originating from human or technical errors), 
as threats are not likely to be “… observable, tangible, and proximate” (Albrechtsen, 2003, p. 7). 
Another addition to security is that there has to be an adversary (e.g. Threat agent, a person with 
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an intention of performing a malicious act) present in order for a malfunction to be a matter of 
security. Without an adversary, a deviation from expected behavior would then have to be caused 
by some form of error or accident (Singer & Friedman, 2014).  
Cyber Security. 
Definitions concerning cyber security and accompanying terms in this thesis are mostly 
retrieved from International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). More specifically the ISO/IEC 27000:2014 (ISO/IEC, 
2014) is used for general definitions, while IOC/IEC 27032:2012 (ISO/IEC, 2012) is used for 
definitions directly related to cyber security. When more explanation of terms is deemed 
necessary, other definitions are included to clarify or discuss a topic.   
To give an explanation of the concept of cyber security, it can be useful to start with the 
concept of information security. Information security is defined by ISO/IEC as the “preservation 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.” (ISO/IEC, 2014, p. 4). In a note to 
the definition, ISO/IEC also add “authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation, and reliability…” 
(ISO/IEC, 2014, p. 4) to the list of properties that may be involved with the concept. The way 
information is stored varies from digital storage, material writings, or in the form where people 
are in possession of knowledge. The way information is transmitted can for example be in a 
conversation, electronically, or by postal services (ISO/IEC, 2014). The CIA triad shown in 
figure 1 has previously been used to illustrate how to ensure the security of information. The 
message within the triad is also valid to many aspects of cyber security (Von Solms & Van 
Niekerk, 2013).  
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Figure 1. CIA triad/triangle, also known as the AIC triad. Adapted from (Harris, 2012, pp. 22-23) 
 
The property of confidentiality is understood by that information is kept unavailable from 
unauthorized people, entities, or processes. Integrity is a property with relevance to the accuracy 
and completeness of something. Availability refers to how accessible and usable something is 
when an authorized entity tries to access and/or use it (ISO/IEC, 2014). 
ISO/IEC defines cyber security in the same way as they define information security. The 
difference is that information within the concept of cyber security is with respect to information 
accessible through the cyberspace. It is therefore implied that information and the protection of 
information is a part of the concept cyber security. The standard lists a range of assets within the 
concept of cyber security, including information, software, physical, people, and even intangibles 
like reputation. In a note about the various types of assets in the cyberspace, ISO/IEC states that 
for simplicity, assets are often only seen as information or resources (ISO/IEC, 2012, p. 15). 
Cyberspace is a term originating from the short stories and novels written by the science fiction 
author William Gibson in the early 1980`s (Singer & Friedman, 2014). The cyberspace is defined 
by ISO as “…complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, software and 
services on the Internet by means of technology devices and networks connected to it, which does 
not exist in any physical form” (ISO/IEC, 2012, p. 4). Despite that the cyberspace does not exist 
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in any physical form, it is dependent on physical means to be able to store and transmit the 
digital data that the cyberspace is made out of. ICT encompasses the technology and equipment 
used for digital transfer and digital storage of data, and ICT security is thus the protection of 
these technologies (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). 
According to Von Solms and Van Niekerk (2013), there is a variety of different 
information sources that interchangeably use the concepts of information security and cyber 
security. They argue that the concepts, although overlapping, have key distinctions that need to 
be taken into account. One difference lies in how the human role in a cyber security perspective 
have an additional dimension compared to information security, where in cyber security humans 
can be both targets of, and contributors to a cyber attack unaware of their participation (Von 
Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). What also is worth noting is that Von Solms and Van Niekerk 
(2013) points out the possibility of a cyber security attack to cause direct harm or affect humans 
including their personal capacity and to society, while a breach in information security could 
only indirectly lead to the same. The term direct harm I believe would have to be seen from a 
different point of view compared to direct physical harm. A cyber attack would always be 
utilized with some form of digital means, and a cyber attack targeted at humans or society would 
therefore always be the result of an incident that initially took place in a digital context (Singer & 
Friedman, 2014). 
 
The assets one wants to secure may also differ between information security and cyber 
security, as the assets within the concept of cyber security may include non-information assets in 
addition to information assets. They point out that their view of broader boundaries within the 
concept of cyber security compared to information security is in coherence with the ISO 27032 
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standard (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). Solms and Niekerk refers to those non-information 
assets with examples such as cyber bullying that can cause direct harm to a person, home 
automation appliances with applications connected to web based management systems, digital 
media piracy leading to a negative impact on the value system, and cyber terrorism that could set 
the wellbeing of society as a whole at risk (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). An illustration of 
the relationship between information-, ICT-, and cyber security is shown in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Relationship between information-, ICT-, and cyber security. Adapted from figure 4 
(Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013, p. 101). 
Threat agents. The objectives of a cyber attack is to cause loss of integrity, availability, 
confidentiality, or physical destruction. A cyber attack could then result in destruction, exposure, 
modification, disabling, theft, malfunctions, disclosure, physical harm, unauthorized access, or 
use of an asset (Gori, 2009; ISO/IEC, 2012).  
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Threat agents or threat actors are groups or individuals that take part of, performs, or that 
supports a cyber attack (ISO/IEC, 2012).  Threat agents includes groups or individuals like 
“…disgruntled employees, criminals, hackers, nation- states, and terrorists.” (U.S. Coast Guard, 
2014, p. 46). In order to assess vulnerabilities and risks in an organization, understanding threat 
agent’s motives, their capabilities, and intentions as shown in table 1 are considered important 
knowledge in order to identify vulnerabilities and to perform risk assessment (ISO/IEC, 2012). 
Table 1 
Threat agent`s motivation, capabilities, and intentions (ISO/IEC, 2012, p. 17). 
 Motivation Capabilities Intentions 
  
Religious 
Political  
Economic 
 
Knowledge 
Funding  
Size  
 
Fun 
Crime 
Espionage 
 
There are numerous ways of which a threat agent can perform a cyber attack directed 
against an organization`s information and physical assets. An attack can be initiated towards an 
organization`s assets from inside of (internal), or from outside (external) an organizations local 
networks. A combination of the two is also a possibility. If the attack is initiated from within the 
organizations network, the threat agent is likely an employee (insider), or someone who has 
gained unauthorized access to the company`s local networks. An attack from outside the local 
networks (e.g. through the internet) can be directed towards the organizations publicly facing 
systems, or assets located in the local network (ISO/IEC, 2012).  
Ship cyber vulnerability 
Industrial control systems. The vulnerability of a vessel to a cyber attack is amongst 
other things related to the many industrial control systems (ICS) located onboard a ship. These 
ICS are an important part of many commercial ships as they perform essential functions 
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including “…manage propulsion, support navigation and communications, provide fire 
protection, operate safety systems, and manage cargo loading and discharge.” (Wallischeck, 
2013, p. 10). Actually there could be several hundred ICS found onboard a ship performing 
different processes as illustrated in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. “Typical Shipboard Industrial Control Systems” (Wallischeck, 2013, p. 10). Credentials: 
www.interschalt.de/. Ownership of the U.S. Government. Reprinted with permission from Volpe, The National 
Transportation Systems Center. U.S. Department of Transportation. 
 
The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these ICS are an important part of 
ensuring a ship`s cyber security. In contrast to information security where confidentiality is seen 
as the most important part of security component, availability is regarded the most important 
security component in ICS. The reason for this is that ICS often are part of continuous and 
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essential processes, and loss of availability of such a system could therefore be critical even for 
short periods of time (Stouffer, Falco, & Scarfone, 2011).     
ICS are often designed with a belief that they are separated from other network systems 
and thereby inaccessible to threat agents. In reality, many control systems are connected to 
networks that can provide remote accessibility from within local (LAN), or remote network 
locations (internet) (Marine Cybernetics, n.d.). The belief that the ICS are separated from other 
systems may originate from a time when ICS mostly were custom based designs, often using 
specialized hardware and software. The ICS has changed as cheaper and more standardized 
systems have become widely available, and now the ICS mostly contains commercial off the 
shelf standardized hardware and software, Ethernet, and Internet Protocol (IP). More 
standardized ICS with remote connectivity provides great opportunities for different companies, 
as it is enable remotely access for diagnostics, maintenance, and monitoring. The downside is 
that the availability of the systems makes them vulnerable to cyber incidents as they are 
becoming more like IT systems. In addition to external cyber threats to the system as a result of 
remote accessibility, there is also a possibility of unauthorized access to an ICS via for example 
removable media devices, LAN, and local wireless connections. As the ICS are used to control 
physical assets, there is a risk in that they could have a direct damaging affect on the 
surroundings including humans, property, or the environment if exposed to a cyber attack 
(Stouffer et al., 2011; Wallischeck, 2013). 
The term ICS encompasses “…supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and…Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)…” 
(Stouffer et al., 2011, pp. 2-1).  
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The main goal of ICS is to manipulate a controlled process by the use of actuators 
(valves, breakers, switches, motors etc.) that receives commands from a controller (PLC etc.), 
which receives information from sensors that measure physical properties of the process. A set 
point is programmed in the controller and is used to calculate a new signal that is sent to an 
actuator. Information from the process can then be sent to human machine interface (HMI) that 
provides a graphical interface for an operator to receive information about-, and make 
adjustments to the process (Stouffer et al., 2011, pp. 2-3).  
SCADA systems are typically used onboard ships (CyberKeel, 2014), and provides a way 
to gather information about, and to control dispersed assets from remote locations. Remote 
connections via satellite from ICS enables connections to shipping operators (Radan, n.d.), while 
equipment suppliers are using remote connections to “monitor, service and upgrade software 
components on the vessels.”(CyberKeel, 2014, p. 14)  
Navigational equipment. Many vessels today navigate with the help of technological 
aids including GPS (Global Positioning System), ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and 
Information System), and AIS (Automatic Identification System). GPS receivers are identified to 
be vulnerable to attacks that could block or spoof the GPS and could result in a loss of 
availability in that the signals are lost, or a loss of integrity as data can be manipulated to show 
wrong time and location (Wallischeck, 2013). ECDIS systems have been proven to be penetrable 
from both internal and external sources, and access could give an attacker the ability to affect 
availability, integrity, and confidentiality of data on the system. ECDIS systems can be 
connected to the Internet for chart downloads, and as it also is connected to the internal network 
on the ship to receive data from sensors, an attacker could potentially get access to other onboard 
assets. AIS have been demonstrated to be vulnerable for a number of different threats involving 
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integrity of the information. AIS signals can be manipulated to show false information about the 
ship to the vessels crew, as well as to stakeholders with a legitimate interest in details concerning 
the ship (CyberKeel, 2014).  
Reported cyber incidents  
This section tries to give an overview of different cyber incidents that potentially could 
be connected with risks in the Norwegian maritime sector regarding physical and information 
assets. 
For general cyber incidents in Norway, the Norwegian National Security Authority 
(NSM) did in 2014 manually handle 5069 cyber incidents of which 88 were considered severe, in 
2013 they manually handled 3400 with 51 severe incidents, and 2012 they handled 2332 with 46 
severe incidents. The majority of these incidents relates to cyber espionage directed towards 
private and public organizations. The figures are indicating that there is an increase in the 
number of cyber incidents amongst Norwegian organizations (NSM, 2015).  
The dark figures for cyber related incidents are probably many times higher than figures 
presented by NSM. A report looking at dark figures for unreported cyber incidents from 
Norwegian organizations discovered a large gap between actual and reported cyber incidents. By 
collecting data from various sources including automated reporting sensors, it is estimated that 
around 50% of large companies (>100 employees) was subjected to some form of cyber attack in 
2013. Without data from other sources, a survey was conducted on the same population. Of the 
respondents in the survey only 5% reported that they had reported a cyber incident in relations to 
hacking. There are however a large uncertainty about the findings in the report (NSR, 2014).  
To the authors knowledge there are not many reported cyber security incidents with 
relations to the Norwegian maritime sector available to the public. There are however one 
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incident that has received the medias attention. The incident happened at Ulstein Group in spring 
of 2014. The Ulstein Group`s is a parent group of companies involved in amongst other things 
maritime design and solutions, shipbuilding, power and control, property, ship ownership and 
investments (Ulstein Group, 2013). The company is considered innovative with own 
development and large international activity. Unknown unauthorized actors gained access to their 
computer systems and managed to maintain access to their information assets over a period of at 
least one week. At the release of the cited article the company did not know what kind of 
information that was retrieved by the perpetrators (Ruset, 2014). The files were allegedly 
encrypted before they were retrieved from the company’s systems, making them hard to identify 
(NSM, 2015). The attack on Ulstein group happened despite of what is described by a company 
representative as very good security systems (Ruset, 2014). The company chose to have an open 
dialogue about the incident based on the idea that communication with other companies is an 
important part of security work. The incident was identified due to abnormal network traffic and 
resolved with the help of governmental authorities (Ervik & Hansen, 2014).  
Vulnerabilities in Norwegian water supply infrastructure were identified by NSM in 
2014. An attack that exploited this vulnerability could potentially lead to a stop in water supply. 
The oil and energy sector was in 2014 prone to a cyber attack involving over 50 companies. The 
targeted and coordinated attack was conducted with emails containing malicious attachments, 
and is considered the largest cyber attack ever directed against Norwegian ICT infrastructure 
(NSM, 2015).   
Equipment made by a company that has been infected with some form of malware could 
potentially create a risk for the customer of that product. An example of such an attack is found 
in a case where barcode scanners were delivered pre infected to a company. The malware was 
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found in purchased bar code scanners that created a backdoor for criminals into their networks. 
This kinds of attacks point out the importance of evaluating hardware suppliers (CyberKeel, 
2014).  
Two incidents are infamous for causing physical damage. The Stuxnet worm caused the 
most famous incident where physical damage has been reported. Kaspersky Lab discovered 
Stuxnet in 2010. By examining the code, Kaspersky and other security firms discovered a highly 
sophisticated malicious code programmed to attack the Iranian nuclear power program. More 
precisely, Siemens Microsoft based software used to program industrial control systems that 
operated the Iranian centrifuges were targeted. The PLC`s used to monitor and control sensors 
and actuators were compromised, and the speed of the centrifuges could then be set to self-
destruct. Stuxnet initially infects a system with malicious code placed on a USB stick. After a 
computer has been infected, the worm spreads undetected into the system while checking if other 
computers are part of the correct Siemens ICS. When finding a match it tries to update itself 
before it gathers information about system operations, before the information is subsequently 
applied to attack the centrifuges. If the worm does not find the correct ICS system it will not 
perform any malicious actions. The complexity of the code together with information leaks 
indicates that United States and Israeli governments developed Stuxnet. Since the discovery of 
Stuxnet it has spread outside its intended area of use, rediscovered in networks at private 
companies, and widely available for malicious actors to use parts of the code in developing their 
own (Kushner, 2013). 
 An unnamed German steel mill was subjected to an advanced persistent threat attack on 
their internal systems and industrial components. The date of the event is not revealed in the 
document. The attack infiltrated the steel mills systems through spear phishing emails disguised 
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as from a trusted source that together with social engineering first stuck their office network, and 
then found its way into their production networks. The damages from the attack were massive as 
control components or entire installations broke down, resulting in the uncontrolled shut down of 
a blast furnace (Federal Office for Information Security, 2014). 
Like the examples of Stuxnet, the German steel mill, and the vulnerability of the 
Norwegian water supply infrastructure, equipment and control systems installed on vessels may 
also have vulnerabilities that could lead to physical damage. The hypothetical scenarios 
including a cyber attack on a ship`s systems or equipment can result in disasters for people, 
organizations, and the environment.         
Stakeholders in the Norwegian maritime sector. 
To assess the awareness of the maritime sector, two groups were identified as vital to the 
maritime sector, and to cyber security. The groups were chosen because of the large and 
important maritime fleet owned by shipping companies that has a connection to Norway, and 
that the maritime equipment supplier industry in Norway is world leading. The author assess 
these two groups as important to ensure cyber security on a vessel, and their importance in the 
Norwegian maritime sector is high as they together account for about 76% of the total value 
creation in the maritime sector in 2012 (Jakobsen et al., 2014).  
Shipping companies description. The ownership, operation, and management of ships 
can be organized in a variety of different arrangements. Shipowners are as the name indicates 
fully or partially owners of one or more ships/vessels and are making the final decisions 
concerning the ship. The term shipowners is also interchangeably used to describe a ship owning 
company, also known as a shipping company. The shipping companies range from single owners 
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to large organizations, with different structures in both organization and in decision-making 
(Branch, 2007; Stopford, 2009) 
Vessels can be registered independently from the ship owning company`s location or 
nationality. Often the vessels are registered in tax favorable states called flags of convenience, 
commonly by one–ship companies with a sole purpose of owning an individual vessel. A holding 
company can have the role as shareholder in the one-ship companies, with the previously 
mentioned ship owner or shipping company as the beneficial owner of the holding company. In 
this way, a ship owner or shipping company may have several ships registered in different 
nations around the world while the company has its headquarter in e.g. Norway. The jurisdiction 
of the flag under which the ship is registered applies, and the international maritime conventions, 
codes, and recommendations provided by International Maritime Organization (IMO) serve as 
general standards (Stopford, 2009).  
A ship operator needs not to be the owner of his controlled fleet. Often vessels are 
chartered from a ship owner or investor to a charterer. Through different charter agreements 
(charter-parties) the charterer to varying degrees operates and provides management of the 
vessels. Charter agreements are normally accomplished with the help of shipbrokers and 
standardized charter-parties (Stopford, 2009). In a bare boat charter (demise charter), the 
charterer takes over the responsibilities associated with the vessel and can then be regarded as 
the disponent owner A shipping company may provide day-to-day management of ships in-
house, or partially or fully outsource the task to dedicated management companies (Branch, 
2007).  
Equipment supplier’s description. In a report by Menon Business Economics made on 
the behalf of the Maritime Dept. Federation of Norwegian Industries, figures for the Norwegian 
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equipment suppliers were presented. The figures were categorized by different main and 
subgroup, and as the maritime equipment suppliers often provides equipment to other sectors 
besides the maritime, figures were calculated by only including the maritime part of the 
companies operation (Mellbye & Jakobsen, 2014). 
As the focus in this thesis lies primarily on equipment suppliers that deliver equipment to 
ships/vessels, the groups of companies that deliver equipment made for rigs (drilling equipment), 
and equipment for the fishing fleet and fish farming (marine equipment) is seen as less 
important. The third group of the maritime equipment suppliers are the ship`s equipment 
suppliers (i.e. the companies that deliver equipment to ships/vessels) and includes the subgroups: 
mechanical equipment, electrical and electronic equipment, ship equipment design, trade, and 
other operating equipment. The subgroups that are of interest in this thesis are mechanical 
equipment, electrical and electronic equipment, and ship equipment design companies. Together 
the three subgroups account for approximately 67% of the 63.3 billion NOK ship`s equipment 
suppliers total turnover, and employs 13750 out of the total 19284 that are employed in the 
Ship`s equipment suppliers group (Mellbye & Jakobsen, 2014). 
 The ship equipment suppliers have a large share of exports with about 90% of their total 
turnover (if trading companies are excluded to avoid duplicated figures), or around 8% of 
Norway’s total Exports. The high export percentage includes equipment sold to Norwegian 
shipping companies that operate in foreign countries, equipment sold via Norwegian yards to 
foreign companies, and direct sales. If one only looks at the equipment that ends up at 
Norwegian shipping companies regardless of their operations location, almost 30% of the 
equipment ends up at Norwegian shipping companies (Mellbye & Jakobsen, 2014, p. 19). 
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Connected stakeholders. In addition to the shipping companies and equipment suppliers 
that are the main focus of this thesis, several other stakeholders may have a direct or indirect role 
to ensure a level of cyber security in the Norwegian maritime sector. Two of the stakeholders are 
described in the subsequent section.  
 Insurance. Insurance has been an important player for shipping companies for ages, and 
offers a way to transfer risk. Cyberinsurance is a field of great expansion and development, it is 
also getting noticed in the maritime sector.   
There are several risks that could lead to substantial monetary loss, including damages to 
reputation, business interruption, and theft of valuable information assets. With growing cyber 
threats and increased reliance on ICT systems, cyberinsurance is one way an organization can 
deal with risks, by transferring financial risk to another party in exchange for an agreed insurance 
premium. Other ways to deal with cyber risks is through self-insurance, where funds is set aside 
to be used if an incident occurs, or through self protection by introducing policies, awareness, 
and technical measures. A combination of methods is probably the favored choice, and for each 
method there is a need to identify threats and vulnerabilities to be able to quantify the associated 
risk and find the best possible solution (Toregas & Zahn, 2014).  
As premiums are often based on the risk level of a given company, cyber security 
measures that lower risk may benefit a company with a lower premium. In this way insurers can 
help to improve innovation and cyber security investments within organizations. There are 
however those that argue cyberinsurance as negative to organizational cyber security work in that 
cyber risks as to complex to quantify, and actual losses to hard to prove   (Oğüt, Raghunathan, & 
Menon, 2011; Toregas & Zahn, 2014). 
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The financial losses related to these attack can be high, but a cyber attack may also result 
in physical damage to people and property. In these scenarios a more sophisticated and complex 
insurance philosophy would be required. The maritime insurance industry lags behind the 
technologic development but recently they have started to focus on bodily injury and property 
damage caused by incidents related to cyber incidents. The insurance coverage under 
development would then go beyond interruption of business, network security, and privacy, to 
also include physical damage caused by cyber events. There is however a possibility that 
coverage can be manuscripted for a specific risk if the underwriter is provided with enough 
information about it (Greenwald, 2014).  
International Maritime organization. IMO conventions, codes, and recommendations 
cover many areas within shipping with emphasis on safety, security, and the environment. 
Requirements found in IMO conventions and codes are mandatory for member states (including 
Norway), whilst recommendations are not. Recommendations are by some states implemented 
into national legislation (Branch, 2007).  
Conventions and codes are monitored by inspections and certifications performed by 
classification societies on the behalf of flag states or ship owners. Classification societies are also 
involved in legislative work as they often participate in the role as technical advisors for IMO 
delegations (Branch & Robarts, 2014).   
 
In the maritime domain the concept of security had a boost after the 9/11 attacks on the 
World Trade Center in 2001 with the introduction of the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) code, implemented as chapter XI-2 in the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
convention the following year. The code introduced security into the ship and port environment 
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by adding a layer of mandatory security requirements and recommendation guidelines to 
SOLAS. The code includes one mandatory part (part A), and together with a part (Part B) with 
recommendations in order to provide a framework for risk assessment, identification and 
assessment of key operations and threats, cooperation and exchange of information, identify and 
delegate roles and responsibility in order to ensure a certain level of security. The recommended 
part of the ISPS code explains good practices to fulfill the requirements of the mandatory part 
(Branch & Robarts, 2014; International Maritime Organization, 2003).  
Unfortunately it may be the case that the ISPS code has major deficiencies in today’s 
more technologically advanced world, as according to ENISA (2011) the code does not address 
cyber security but focus on physical security threats and safety. 
Currently no rules or regulations concerning cyber security have been recognized by the 
author to be released by IMO. It seems however that things are starting to happen as IMO has 
been advised to address maritime cyber security on several occasions, and now the topic is up for 
discussion. On the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) ninety-fourth session in 2014, cyber 
security was discussed based on a proposal of cyber security guidelines submitted by Canada and 
the United States. The proposed guidelines aims to enhance the cyber resilience of systems 
amongst other found in ships, ports, and marine facilities. The guidelines were proposed to be 
voluntary and are seen as a necessity for maritime stakeholders because of the increasing use and 
reliance on cyber systems. It is interpreted by the author that the proposed guidelines is intended 
to be implemented in the ISPS code in order to help achieve the code`s goals, also to now 
include cyber security measures. (IMO, 2014c). 
IEC is currently working on the IEC 61162-460 standard that is intended to enable safe 
and secure interconnections to external sources, by setting higher requirements to systems 
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operation and components. The external sources “include other ship networks, off-ship data 
sources and removable external data sources”(IMO, 2014a, p. 2).  
IMO have also set criteria on navigational and vessel identification equipment that can be 
associated with cyber security risks. ECDIS is today an accepted method for chart carriage, but if 
used fully or partially, backup arrangements are required, Automatic identification system (AIS) 
is required to be installed on all passenger vessels, vessels larger than 300 gross tonnage on 
international voyages, and on vessels larger that 500 gross tonnage if they are not sailing 
internationally (IMO, n.d.-a, n.d.-c). This means that most ships are equipped with navigational 
systems related to cyber security issues. 
 
Cyber security awareness  
Awareness is defined as “Knowledge or perception of a situation or fact”(Oxford 
Dictionaries, n.d.-a), or “Concern about and well-informed interest in a particular situation or 
development” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.-a). Cyber security awareness can then be linked by the 
authors interpretation of the definition to an organization`s knowledge, perception, concern, and 
well-informedness of cyber security.   
The Danish cyber security company CyberKeel did in a whitepaper regarding maritime 
cyber security point out some awareness issues in the maritime sector. They pointed out that 
cyber security often is considered a technical issue that is delegated to the IT department or Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) of companies, that there often is doubt about whether cyber threats 
actually are real, and if they are relevant to own company. Together with little awareness on 
cyber incidents from comparable industries, these elements are part of a general unawareness of 
cyber risks found amongst senior decision makers in the maritime sector (CyberKeel, 2014). 
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Low Cyber security awareness may be connected to the low number of reported incidents within 
the maritime sector, as well as a lack of reporting mechanisms with a specific focus on the 
maritime sector. As incidents are not gaining the attention of stakeholders, the awareness is kept 
at a low level, leading to “…a low sense-of-urgency combined with an inadequate preparedness 
regarding cyber risks.”  (ENISA, 2011, p. 8). Due to these factors there is a probability that a 
cyber attack directed towards maritime ICT systems could have a greater impact than it would if 
directed against sectors with higher cyber security awareness. To deal with the low awareness in 
the maritime sector ENISA recommends that in the short term national awareness campaigns 
should be developed specifically for cyber security in the maritime domain (ENISA, 2011). The 
Norwegian government has not yet released any awareness campaigns specific to the maritime 
sector recognized by the author. The Norwegian government did however in 2012 issue a 
strategy for cyber security with an accompanying action plan that is aimed among other things to 
aid and raise the awareness among decision makers in the Norwegian private sector (Norwegian 
Ministries, 2012a). The action plan describes that a lack of cyber security awareness constitutes a 
high and increasing risk, and that owners of critical infrastructure often are unaware of or lacks 
knowledge about vulnerabilities, and precautionary measures (Norwegian Ministries, 2012d, p. 
8).  
Management and measures 
As no specific maritime guidelines or requirements yet are available to the authors 
knowledge, more general cyber security management and precautions are discussed in this 
section.  
On a general basis there are issued several guidelines for cyber security from different 
standardization organizations including ISO/IEC (ISO/IEC, 2012) on general organizational 
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cyber security, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) concerning 
industrial control systems (Stouffer et al., 2011). As these guidelines and recommendations 
covers a very large field, reaching into complicated risk assessment and management, only a 
collection of some general cyber security recommendations as seen important by the author is 
presented below. 
An organization should focus on understanding the surrounding situation of cyber 
security in relations to own business. Acknowledge if the company are aware of risks, if risks are 
dealt with, and if risk assessment is carried out. Understand vulnerabilities and consider whether 
the company has done enough to reduce them (NSM, 2015). 
 Organization should consider the possibility of their own organizations impact on others 
by its presence in cyberspace. The organization should consider sharing relevant information 
with other stakeholders (ISO/IEC, 2012). 
    Critical assets should be identified and evaluated according to its importance for the 
company, its vulnerabilities, and how they could be protected (ISO/IEC, 2012).    
Assess whether the company has necessary security competence and whether employees 
are aware of how to contribute to the company’s security. Cyber security training should be 
carried out to raise the awareness amongst employees (ISO/IEC, 2012; NSM, 2015). 
Cyber attacks conducted through third parties, suppliers and other partners have already 
been identified used against Norwegian companies. Such attacks might exploit the potentially 
weaker defense mechanisms present at a third party company in order to reach its target 
company. Assessing the state of cyber security amongst partner companies should therefor be 
considered (NSR, 2014).  
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Summary of theory 
The theory provided in this thesis has shown that the maritime sector consist of vital 
organizations in relations to Norway`s economy and transportation of necessary goods. The 
shipping companies and Ship`s equipment suppliers are of special interest to this thesis because 
of their vital role in the Norwegian maritime sector. Cyber security is a matter of information 
security, ICT security, as well as security of physical assets that are connected to a network or the 
Internet. Cyber security should be of concern not just for the IT department of an organization, 
but should be part of a managerial action plan in order to deal with it properly. The maritime 
sector is not only vulnerable of threats to their informational assets, but also their ships with its 
equipment may be targeted in a cyber attack. This has been proven possible through incidents 
striking the maritime, as well as other sectors with similar assets. A cyber attack can be 
performed from inside or from outside an organization`s network, be perpetrated by different 
actors and can take many different forms. To deal with the threats it is important that companies 
are aware of threats, and knows how to deal with them.  
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Method  
 
Sampling 
Because of the complex composition of the maritime sector, as well as the intricately 
maritime company structures, necessary information required to create a randomized sample 
relevant to the survey was deemed unrealistic. A sample based on a non-probability sampling 
approach was seen as more feasible. The chosen sampling technique was used in order to give 
the author the ability to choose a sample based on specific criteria that by a qualitative subjective 
interpretation by the author would provide the best possible representative sample with relations 
to cyber security. The sampling technique was also utilized in order to reach potential 
participants because of the low profile, diverse activities, and equipment belonging to the 
companies in the maritime sector. The sample can be regarded as a non-probability sample 
chosen by the use of a purposive sampling approach (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
Cyber security includes physical elements such as industrial control systems and 
equipment, and it was seen as a necessity by the author to have a sample with some connection 
to this. As the survey also targets the Norwegian maritime sector, some criteria’s were also set in 
order to reach respondents with a certain connection to Norway. Table 2 shows the selection 
criteria for the sample. 
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Table 2 
Criteria for the sample 
 
Group1: Shipping companies Group 2: Ship`s equipment suppliers  
Connection to Norway. Connection to Norway. 
 
Owns, operate, and/or manages 
vessels/ships. 
 
 
Has equipment with some degree of 
automation. 
Delivers equipment used onboard 
vessels (excluding rigs). 
 
 
In order to obtain a sample fulfilling this criteria`s the respondents were selected from the 
member lists of Maritime Dept. Federation of Norwegian Industries (Maritim Bransjeforening) 
(Norsk Industri, n.d.), and the Norwegian Shipowners` Association (Norges rederiforbund, 
2014). The members list of the two maritime interest groups served as a good starting point as 
they have membership requirements that include, to varying degree, a connection to Norway 
(Personal communication with interest group organizations, 2015). Because these requirements 
are not widely available to the public, I have not been able to specify the degree of Norwegian 
affiliation of the survey participants. Relevant ship owning companies that were members of the 
Norwegian Shipowners` Association were narrowed to fulfill the criteria by conducting a review 
of the possible respondents websites. Following the criteria`s set excluded companies solely 
engaged in for example rig operation, crew management or catering companies. In addition, 
Norwegian Shipowners` Association employees provided some guidance in what companies to 
exclude from the list. Companies complying with criteria were then contacted by phone to 
retrieve best possible contact information for submission of the questionnaire. The original list 
was eventually narrowed down from about 150 to 73 companies.  
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The equipment suppliers was selected from the members list of Maritime Dept. 
Federation of Norwegian Industries (Maritime Bransjeforening), followed by a website review to 
identify whether some of their products (equipment or systems) contained some degree of 
automation. Those that did not supply equipment containing some degree of automation, for 
example vessel furnishing companies were excluded from the list. Contact information was 
obtained via Maritime Dept. Federation of Norwegian Industries members list that consists of 
188 companies. 39 companies in total within the ship`s equipment suppliers category were 
selected to be a part of the sample.  
Survey 
As a part of this thesis a survey was issued to relevant participants in order to answer the 
thesis research questions. The information given at the start of the survey can bee seen in the 
appendix. The survey aims to gather quantitative data on cyber security awareness and measures 
found in the maritime sector. 
The survey questions were mostly created with information from (ISO/IEC, 2012), 
(Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, 2014), (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013), 
and (ENISA, 2011). Some answer choices for multiple answer questions was identified through 
Internet searches to find reasonable figures and possible answer to the questions. Questions were 
also generated as a result of input and discussions with secondary supervisors.  
  The survey was constructed with the help of the online survey platform SurveyMonkey 
(SurveyMonkey, n.d.). A paid subscription was signed with the service provider in order to create 
the desired survey outline and functions. The survey has not received any sponsorship or 
funding, an exception to this would be if Buskerud and Vestfold University College grant survey 
expenditures refund.  
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The survey was distributed to the two defined groups within the Norwegian maritime 
sector; Ship`s equipment suppliers, and shipping companies. Because of a possible risks involved 
with identifying individual companies participating in this survey, a choice was made to only 
provide limited explanatory information about the participants. However, in order to give some 
degree of applicability to the results of the survey, some general information about survey 
participants was seen as necessary.   
Survey design 
The survey was designed as a self-completion questionnaire with no intervention from 
the researcher except from the information provided at the start of the survey (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). 
About 85% of the questions were formed as statements followed by a response scale 
using a closed verbal format referred to as the Likert scale. The scale was used in order to 
examine the attitude of participants against the different statements, and because of the closed 
question format (answers are predefined by me), both time used to answer the survey and the 
data analysis process was made easier compared to if respondents themselves were to insert own 
formulated answers (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The Likert scale was arranged in order from 
Strongly Disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The scale was 
then coded from their string ordinal values to numeric values ranging from 1-5,  in order for the 
resulting dataset to be applicable for further analysis in IBM SPSS statistics software. The used 
scale and corresponding coded values are shown in table 3. 
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Table 3   
Coding from Likert to numeric scale 
 
 Likert scale  Coded value 
Strongly disagree 1 
Disagree 2 
Neither agree nor disagree 3 
Agree 4 
Strongly agree 5 
 
The remaining questions contained multiple choices or interval ranking scales. The 
multiple-choice questions had predefined text alternatives with an option to choose “other 
(please specify)” in case other responses than the suggested by the author could be of 
importance. On questions based on answer rankings, the ranking scales consisted of predefined 
text or numeric interval alternatives.  
The respondents were informed on the first page of the survey with the following 
information about terms used in the questionnaire “assets are categorized as either Information 
assets or physical/non-information assets. Information assets include information that has value 
to your company, stored or transmitted with the use of ICT technology. Physical/non-information 
assets include physical assets accessible through ICT technology. For the equipment suppliers 
physical/non-information assets are limited to equipment/systems that is or will be installed on 
ships/vessels. For ship owners/operators/management, the actual ships/vessels with its 
equipment/systems that is accessible through ICT are considered physical/non-information 
assets. Physical/non-information assets can include but is not limited to; remote management 
systems, control systems, SCADA, telecom equipment, navigation equipment, information 
equipment, AIS, propulsion technology, safety systems, cargo handling equipment, mooring 
equipment, power management, ballast water treatment etc. Threats are in this survey classified 
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as either internal or external. Internal refers to whether a cyber security incident originates from 
within the organization's network. External refers to if the cyber security incident is conducted 
from outside the organization's network (ie. from internet).” 
Procedure 
 Reaching people within companies with skills to answer questions regarding cyber 
security were attempted by phone calls to every shipping company in the sample. During the 
phone calls, some notes were taken on a general reception of my enquiry. With an explanation of 
my thesis and the survey I got an impression that the topic was shown interest, but that it 
appeared to evoke some skepticism, and possibly a lack of knowledge on the subject. Some 
companies said that they were not answering surveys as a general policy. 
 It was encouraged in a cover letter mail regarding the survey to both the equipment 
suppliers and the shipping companies that recipients should forward the survey to suitable 
persons within the organization. The job position of those answering the survey is thus unknown.  
The survey was sent to a total of 112 companies. 1 recipient replied survey email with 
that the survey was erroneously sent to him/her, and that mails in connection with the survey 
consequently was deleted. In a few other instances the mail address was wrongly spelled or 
obtained, and the survey had to be resent to a corrected address. Others replied for various 
reasons that they were not suitable for the survey as they were part of an international 
organization and thus had little influence on cyber security matters. Two reminder emails were 
sent to all respondents who had not yet answered the questionnaire. The mode of distribution is 
shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 4 
Survey mode of administration. Adapted from figure 7.2 (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 175) 
 
 
Responses. A total of 20 recipients carried out the survey, of those, 19 were considered 
usable and 1 was considered unusable. The usable responses include those who completed the 
survey. With completed is meant that respondents answered the question identifying respondent 
groups in addition to pressing the done button on the final survey page to submit their reply. 
Those partially finishing the survey, i.e. those not pressing the done button on the final page was 
considered unusable. 
The total response rate ” !"#$%&  !"  !"#$%&  !"#$%&'"&(#!"!#$  !"#$%&!!"#!$%&'()  !"  !"#$"%&#%&'()  !"!#"$%  !"  !!!  !"!"#$ ∗ 100 
“ (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 189) would for this survey be  !"!!"!! ∗ 100 =  17.1%.  
Of the respondents who completed the survey, the percentage of questions answered was 
high.  
The respondents were divided into two groups depending on their answer to Q22“My 
organization/business division is considered a:  a) Ship owning/operating company (with or 
without own ship management team), b) Dedicated ship management company, c) Maritime 
equipment supplier.”. As explained in the sampling section, ship owners, operators, and ship 
management companies were sorted into Group 1 (e.g. those who responded alternative a, or 
alternative b), while Group 2 consists of the equipment suppliers (e.g. those who ticked off 
alternative c.). The number of usable responses per group is shown in table 4. 
Survey 
Self-
completion 
questionnaire 
Inernet Email Survey link attachment 
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Table 4 
 
Usable responses per group category 
 
Group Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1.00 12 63.2 63.2 63.2 
2.00 7 36.8 36.8 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 100.0  
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Results 
Cyber attack incidents. Table 5 shows the number of cyber security incidents for 
shipping companies and equipment suppliers categorized by group, internal or external attack 
source of the attack, and the type of asset that the incident targeted.  
Table 5 
 
Q7. In the last 2 years my organization has been subjected to one or more cyber incidents; theft, 
destruction, alternation, hijacking, unauthorized access, exploits, or denial of availability of 
 
Group 
Shipping companies Equipment suppliers 
Count 
Column 
Responses % Count 
Column 
Responses % 
 Information assets, perpetrated by 
an internal source (Employee or 
trusted third party with access to 
internal network). 
0 0.0% 1 9.1% 
Information assets, perpetrated by 
an external source (Malware, 
hackers...) 
2 15.4% 4 36.4% 
Physical/non-information executed 
by internal source (Employee or 
trusted third party with access to 
internal network). 
0 0.0% 1 9.1% 
Physical/non-information executed 
by external source (Malware, 
hackers...) 
1 7.7% 2 18.2% 
To our knowledge we have not 
been subjected to a any form of 
cyber incident 
 
10 76.9% 3 27.3% 
N Total 12 100.0% 7 100.0% 
 
 
 
                           CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS AND MEASURES NORWEGIAN MARITIME SECTOR 43 
Cyber security awareness and precautions towards cyber threats. In order to get a 
meaningful interpretation of the data set, an exploratory factor analysis, more specifically a 
principal components analysis was in collaboration with my main supervisor identified as an 
appropriate analysis.  
An explanatory factor analysis is a tool used in order to find inter-correlations between 
variables and sort them into hypothetical factors (clusters of variables) so that the data set can be 
more easily understood and more manageable. There is no consensus on the minimum number of 
respondents in a factor analysis, however there is an underlying agreement is that there should be 
more respondents than variables (Bryman & Cramer, 2005; Robson, 2011).  
The method used for extraction of factor analysis was principal components. The 
Principal components analysis was conducted on variables Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q8, Q12, Q13, Q14, 
Q15, Q16, Q17, and Q18. To decide on the number of resulting factors (components) in the 
analysis, an extraction criterion known as the Kaiser`s criteria limited the number of factors to 
include only those with an eigenvalue > 1. The rotation used in the factor analysis was an 
orthogonal method named Varimax. Because of the orthogonal method the resulting components 
are unrelated to each other (Bryman & Cramer, 2005). The principal component factor analysis 
revealed three components that together could be used to explain 71.1% of the variance. The 
components with their eigenvalues and variance are shown in table 6.  
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 Table 6 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.563 38.024 38.024 3.353 27.942 27.942 
2 2.376 19.797 57.820 2.602 21.687 49.630 
3 1.595 13.290 71.110 2.578 21.481 71.110 
4 .967 8.061 79.172    
5 .751 6.261 85.433    
6 .606 5.050 90.482    
7 .381 3.172 93.654    
8 .286 2.385 96.039    
9 .266 2.213 98.252    
10 .134 1.114 99.366    
11 .062 .513 99.879    
12 .015 .121 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The resulting rotated component matrix from the principal components analysis are 
shown in table 7. Variables that correlates with lower values than 0.3 or -0.3 with a factor were 
set to be excluded as they are considered unimportant (Bryman & Cramer, 2005). 
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Table 7 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
Q1. The concept of cyber security is well known within 
our organization. 
  .897 
Q2. My organization evaluates cyber security as an 
important topic in relation to our business. 
 .762  
Q3. My organization assess cyber security as an 
increasing concern. 
.322 .715  
Q4. My organization has taken precautionary measures to 
deal with cyber security threats. 
 .656 .304 
Q8. It is likely that my organization could be subjected to 
an attack in the next two years. 
 .839  
Q12. My organization has established good information 
sharing and coordinating procedures for cyber security 
events. 
  .870 
Q13. My organization knows where and how to report a 
cyber security event. 
.430  .784 
Q14. My organization has established partnership with a 
CERT/CIRT/CSIRT team. 
.842   
Q15. My organization has good communication and 
information sharing with other companies in our business 
segment regarding cyber security. 
.705 .490  
Q16. My organization has good communication with our 
third party suppliers regarding cyber security. 
.865   
Q17. Our third party suppliers have established 
procedures to deal with cyber security issues. 
.608   
Q18. My organization sets cyber security requirements 
for new IT/ICT equipment purchases. 
.762   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
 
The three components that are outlined in bold in table 7 was named based on a 
subjective qualitative interpretation of the variables constituting the different components: 
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• Component 1: Collaboration (externally oriented) (Q14, Q15, Q16, Q17, Q18).   
• Component 2: Organizational concern. (Q2, Q3, Q4, Q8). 
• Component 3: Organizational procedures (internally oriented). (Q1, Q12, Q13).  
An independent sample t-test (unpaired two-group t-test) was used to check if there were 
any statistical differences between shipping companies and equipment suppliers on the 
components. With confidence interval was set to 95%, the test showed a significant difference 
between the Shipping companies and equipment suppliers regarding the component 
organizational concern (𝜌 < 0.05.). No significant differences were found between the groups 
on either Collaboration (externally oriented), or Organizational procedures (internally oriented) 
components. Mean values of the variables constituting the factors are shown in table 8 
Table 8 
 
Mean scores of components variables 
 
 Group 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Organizational concern. 1.00 10 3.7750 .38097 .12047 
2.00 7 4.1429 .65918 .24915 
Collaboration (externally oriented). 1.00 12 3.4167 .50061 .14451 
2.00 7 3.2000 1.08321 .40941 
Organizational procedures (internally 
oriented). 
1.00 11 3.4848 .65597 .19778 
2.00 6 3.3889 1.04172 .42528 
 
 
 
Differences between measures towards cyber security. Four variables were created on 
the basis of the questionnaire that asked questions regarding the shipping companies and 
equipment suppliers measures on cyber security in relations to Internal threats information 
assets (Q36-41), External threats information assets (Q42-45), Internal threats physical/non-
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information assets (Q46-49), and External threats physical/non-information assets (Q50-53). 
Mean values were created for the variables by adding each item within the variable and then 
dividing it by the number of items (𝑋 = !! ). The mean values of the variables sorted by group 
are shown in table 9. 
Table 9 
 
Mean scores variables 
   Variables N Mean Std. Deviation 
External threats 
information assets. 
19 3.4342 .60577 
Internal threats 
information assets  
18 3.5667 .58712 
External threats 
physical/non-
information assets 
18 3.2361 .61520 
Internal threats 
physical/non-
information assets 
18 3.2500 .52859 
Valid N (listwise) 17   
 
 
 
A repeated measures general linear model (GLM) analysis was performed in order to test 
the mean variables against each other on several levels, and between groups. The variables were 
defined to a two level factor named Physical vs. Information, and a two level factor named 
external vs. internal. Together with the two level factor groups, they constituted a (2x2x2) matrix 
(Physical vs. Information x External vs. Internal x Group1vs. Group2). Physical vs. Information 
and External vs. Internal was used within subjects, and Group1 (Shipping companies) vs. Group2 
(Equipment suppliers) between subjects (Bryman & Cramer, 2005). Resulting relevant figures 
for Physical vs. Information is shown in figure 5, internal vs. external x physical vs. information 
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for shipping companies are shown in figure 6, and internal vs. external x physical vs. information 
for equipment suppliers are shown in figure 7. 
The analysis revealed a statistical significant difference between Physical vs. Information 
indicated by (𝑝 < 0.05).  
 
 
A statistical significant difference was also revealed between Physical vs. Information vs 
group, indicated by (𝑝 < 0.01.). No other significant differences were found by the GLM 
analysis. A t-test verified the findings (𝑝 < 0.05.), and pointed out measures towards external 
physical was significantly different between the groups.   
 
Figure 5. Physical vs. information cyber security measures. Y-axis represents the mean score, 
while Physical is connected with 1 and information with 2 on the x-axis.  
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Figure 6. Figures for group 1 (Shipping companies). Comparing internal vs. external security 
measures against physical vs. information cyber security efforts. Y-axis represents the mean 
score, while internal is connected with 1 and external with 2 on the x-axis. A solid line 
represents physical, while information is represented by a dotted line. 
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Figure 7. Figures for group 2 (Equipment suppliers). Comparing internal and external efforts 
against each other and physical information cyber security efforts. Y-axis represents the mean 
score, while internal is connected with 1 and external with 2 on the x-axis. A solid line 
represents physical, while information is represented by a dotted line. 
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Limitations 
The sample in this thesis is based on the members lists from the dominating interest 
groups for maritime equipment suppliers and shipping companies Norwegian. This could be a 
strength as their members represent by the authors evaluation of the members lists, most of the 
major actors within Ship`s equipment suppliers and Shipping companies. It can however not be 
assumed that all companies in Norway that fulfilled the sampling criteria in this thesis are 
members of these interest groups.  
The chosen sampling technique may be argued to have a low degree of generalizability 
because of the purposive selection of respondents. Purposive sampling in the form of non-
probability sampling technique that is known to have limitations in generalization to larger 
populations (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
The response rate of the questionnaire can be argued to be low, and thereby limited in its 
ability to be generalized. The response rate of 17.1% can possibly be explained by factors 
identified in other research on information security. A survey that was part of a Ph.D. thesis by 
Albrechtsen in 2008 was carried out amongst Norwegian persons responsible for information 
security in different organization. The survey yielded a response rate of 16%. Using the response 
rate formula applied in my thesis, the response rate would have been approximately 13% because 
their calculations included unusable responses. The possible explanations discussed included 
results from another study of information security performed by Kotulic and Clark in 2004 that 
had an even lower response rate. The study by Kotulic and Clark was followed up by a survey in 
an effort to explain the low response rate. Possible explanations included that there existed 
policies within companies not share their information security performance, and unwillingness to 
spend valuable managing time on surveys (Albrechtsen, 2008).  
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A certain level of skewness was detected in the data set slightly biased towards a positive 
attitude on questions regarding self-assessment of own security awareness and measures. That 
respondents typically want to show themselves from their best side is a common disadvantage of 
surveys that is dependent on answers from respondents (Robson, 2011). However, as this survey 
is about cyber security, an even greater bias might be present. This skewness was also present in 
the survey conducted by Albrechtsen (2008). Albrechtsen argues that because of the skewness, 
respondents consider themselves “…the best of the class…” (Albrechtsen, 2008, p. 49). The 
skewness together with the low response of the survey could indicate that “only those who have 
knowledge and interest in information security responded to the survey.” (Albrechtsen, 2008, p. 
49). Since information security is a part of cyber security, this reasoning should also be valid for 
my survey. 
To ask only one respondent from each organization to represent the whole company 
means that a high number of companies can more easily be included in the survey, saving both 
time and resources. It may however be unwise to expect one person to know the answer to all the 
questions asked in the questionnaire, and the respondent may also try to favor his/her role in the 
company, especially if the respondent has a managing role (Bryman & Bell, 2011). In an effort to 
avoid this in my research it is specified in the cover letter that it was possible to forward the 
questionnaire to be fully or partially completed by other persons in the organization. 
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Discussion 
In this section, each research questions is discussed on the basis of the results obtained 
from the questionnaire. Some theory is used in order to discuss aspects that are seen as important 
by the author. The author introduces some thoughts and opinions about the results in an effort to 
explain and discuss them. It could be important to acknowledge that these are the author’s 
subjective opinions. 
Have they been subjected to cyber attacks? The number of replies on cyber incidents 
shows that of the 12 shipping companies, 10 did not know or had not been subjected to a cyber 
attack. The 2 shipping companies that responded that they had been subjected to a cyber attack 
was attacked by an external threat actor that targeted either their physical or their information 
assets. Of the equipment suppliers, 3 companies reported that they had not been subjected to any 
cyber attack to their knowledge. 4 companies reported that they had been subjected to one or 
more attacks, and 1 company within this group responded that they had been subjected to an 
attack on both physical and information assets from an internal and external source. Another 
company had been subjected to an attack on both information and physical assets perpetrated by 
an external perpetrator, and an external actor attacked the 2 last companies’ information assets. 
This shows that actors in the maritime sector are vulnerable to, and have ben subjected to cyber 
attacks. The attacks was perpetrated from internal and external sources directed at both 
informational and physical assets.  
6 out of 19 companies or 31% of the participants reported that they had been prone to at 
least one cyber attack in the last two years. As cyber attacks against large Norwegian companies 
were estimated at around 50% in 2013 (NSR, 2014), and that there is a chance that companies 
are reluctant to share security information (Albrechtsen, 2008), there is a possibility that the 
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actual incidents are higher than the 31% reported to the survey of this thesis. Comparing the 
results from this thesis with estimated cyber attacks against large Norwegian companies (NSR, 
2014) does not seem to indicate that the actors in the maritime sector are more frequently 
attacked that other Norwegian organization unless there exists unreported attacks. Sharing 
information about incidents may help to raise the awareness about cyber security in the sector 
(ENISA, 2011).  
Are the Norwegian maritime equipment suppliers and ship owners aware of cyber 
security related issues?  A principal components factor analysis revealed three unrelated 
components. Component 2 was interpreted by the author to have a relation to organizational 
concern, based on it`s contained variables that includes my organization evaluates cyber 
security as an important topic in relation to our business, my organization assess cyber security 
as an increasing concern, and it is likely that my organization could be subjected to an attack in 
the next two years. By looking at a definition for awareness “Concern about and well-informed 
interest in a particular situation or development” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.-a) it can be seen a 
likely connection between the component contents and awareness. The last variable in the 
component “My organization has taken precautionary measures to deal with cyber security 
threats” may be less coupled with awareness, but could possibly relate to the other variables as 
precautions taken potentially could be a response of the awareness A significant difference was 
found between the shipping companies and equipment suppliers on the component 
organizational concern. The ship`s equipment suppliers had a higher mean value score of 4.14 
on the Likert scale compared to 3.77 for the shipping companies. This might be an indication that 
the ship`s equipment suppliers are slightly more aware of cyber security related issues than the 
shipping companies. As to the author’s knowledge, no recommended baseline exists in order for 
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me to decide with certainty if the mean values of organizational concern and awareness are good 
or bad. The following interpretation of the mean values is thus based on a subjective 
interpretation by the author. The mean score for the ship`s equipment suppliers could indicate 
that their attitude towards the asked questions are positive as 4 on the Likert scale indicated that 
they agree to the statements and thereby showing a positive attitude towards cyber security 
awareness. A mean value score above 4 is to the authors opinion an indication of that the Ship`s 
equipment suppliers are aware of cyber security related issues on a level that is higher than the 
awareness found by ENISA in 2011 where cyber security awareness in the European maritime 
sector was identified as either very low or even non-existent (ENISA, 2011). Because the 
shipping companies mean values are closer to agree than to the neutral statement on the Likert 
scale, it is by the authors opinion also awareness present amongst the shipping companies that is 
higher that the findings of ENISA. The comparison against ENISA`s findings may however be 
far fetched, as ENISA does not give any information about scale rankings of their findings. As by 
the author’s opinion the awareness is indicated to be higher than the findings in Europe in 2011, 
it could potentially mean that Norwegian organizations in the maritime sector are more aware 
than in the rest of Europe, or that the cyber security awareness in the maritime sector has 
increased on a general basis during the last four years. These assumptions have however not 
taken into account the limitations in that respondents typically want to show themselves from 
their best side in a self-assessment survey. 
Do they take precautions in order to deal with cyber threats? The content in 
component 1 Collaboration (externally oriented) may be described with that precautions are 
taken when collaborating with third party suppliers by ensuring that their partners have 
procedures to deal with cyber security, and for ensuring cyber security for purchases of new 
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equipment. Partnership with a CERT/CIRT/CSIRT team, and good information sharing with 
other companies may indicate that they take precautions by staying updated on cyber security 
issues. Component 3 Organizational procedures (internally oriented) content may be explained 
by precautions taken by ensuring that the concept of cyber security is well known within the 
organization, and by preparation in case of a cyber incident. No significant differences were 
found between the groups on either of the components. Their mean value scores as seen in table 
8 is leaning towards nether agree nor disagree on the Likert scale for both components and 
groups with 3.41 (component 1) and 3.48 (component 3) for the shipping companies, and 3.2 
(component 1) and 3.38 (component 3) for the equipment suppliers. By a subjective 
understanding of the mean values and related components, there is likely that some precautions 
taken in order to deal with cyber security threats. The attitude towards precautions might 
however not be sufficient to avoid cyber threats that from partner companies and their 
equipment, or to communicate relevant information about a cyber attack with other stakeholders 
if an attack should occur. 
Are there any differences in how they relate to physical and information aspects of 
cyber security? A repeated measures GLM analysis was performed in order to find differences 
between Physical vs. Information x External vs. Internal x Group1vs. Group2. A significant 
difference was found between cyber security measures taken towards physical and information 
assets. The difference can be seen in figure 5 where it can bee seen that security measures 
towards information assets has a higher mean value score of 3.41 compared with the measures 
towards the physical assets that has a mean value score of 3.14. This indicates that there is a 
higher focus on measures taken towards information assets than the physical assets.  
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 Are there any differences between the cyber security measures between ship owners 
and equipment suppliers?  The repeated measures GLM analysis showed a significant 
difference on Physical vs. Information x External vs. Internal x Group1vs. Group2  
Figure 7 shows that the ship`s equipment suppliers measures towards physical assets 
against threats from external sources have a mean score of 2.75, while the shipping companies 
(figure 6) have a mean value score of 3.47. A mean score of 2.75 indicates that the mean score is 
below neither agree nor disagree on the Likert scale, and may on a subjective evaluation indicate 
that their cyber security measures are inadequate towards their equipment that is installed on 
ships. A possible explanation based on a subjective interpretation may be if the responsibility of 
securing equipment is transferred to the shipping companies after delivery. The author does 
however not know which one of the two who groups that has the fully or partially responsibility 
of equipment after delivery. 
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Conclusions 
The conclusion of this thesis try to answer to the five research questions regarding the 
assessment of cyber security awareness and measures in the Norwegian maritime sector. 
Have they been subjected to cyber attacks? Yes, actors in the maritime sector are found to 
be vulnerable to cyber attacks on both physical and informational assets. In the results of this 
thesis it is shown that both shipping companies and Ship`s equipment suppliers have been 
subjected to cyber attacks in the last two years. A majority of these attacks was targeting 
informational assets from external threat actors, but both physical and information assets have 
been attacked from external and internal sources. 
Are the Norwegian maritime equipment suppliers and ship owners aware of cyber 
security related issues? The Shipping companies and equipment suppliers both scored high on 
the mean scores on a component regarding cyber security awareness. A significant difference 
between the shipping companies and equipment suppliers was found. With a higher mean value 
score the equipment suppliers were found to have higher cyber security awareness than the 
shipping companies.  
Do they take precautions in order to deal with cyber threats? No significant results were 
obtained to answer this question. The answer to this question is thus left open if deemed 
interesting for further research. 
Are there any differences in how they relate to physical and information aspects of cyber 
security?  Yes, a significant difference was found between cyber security measures taken towards 
physical and information assets. The mean values ranked highest with relations to information 
assets. This shows that there is a higher focus on measures taken towards information assets than 
towards the physical assets. 
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Are there any differences between the cyber security measures between ship owners and 
equipment suppliers? Yes, the ship`s equipment suppliers measures towards physical assets 
against threats from external sources had a mean score of 2.75, while the shipping companies 
mean value scored 3.47. The difference was found to be significant, and hence the shipping 
companies can be said to have a higher focus on measures towards external physical assets. 
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Appendix 
Survey 
 
 
The appendix in this thesis contains the survey issued to both shipping companies and 
equipment suppliers in the maritime sector. The attached survey was extracted from the 
SurveyMonkey platform to PDF format; the PDF was further converted to the PNG picture 
format. The survey was issued to respondents in a graphical manner as shown below, with 
exceptions; text that originally was found in the dropdown menus were excluded due to the non 
compatible format of SurveyMonkey application and image file; any colors present in the 
original survey have been removed; Question number was added to more easily refer to different 
questions.  
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